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STRUCTURAL WAYS TO EMBED A RESEARCH
LABORATORY INTO THE COMPANY: A COMPARISON
BETWEEN PHILIPS AND GENERAL ELECTRIC
1900–1940
F. KEES BOERSMA*
Department of Culture, Organization and Management, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, The
Netherlands
This paper compares the Philips Research Department and the Research Laboratory of the American company
General Electric (GE).1 It argues that it is, above all, the issue of the organization of industrial research, appropriate
leadership and the embeddedness of a research department in the company as a whole that is important for an
historical analysis of an industrial research department. The complex structures that Gilles Holst (the first Philips
research director) and Willis Whitney (the GE research director during the first decades of the twentieth century) set
up in their organizations enabled scientists to keep in touch with the resources provided by the universities, and made
it possible for them to come up with articles, patents and devices for their respective companies. It enabled them also
to strengthen their contacts inside and outside the laboratory’s walls. However, more than his colleague Whitney at
GE, Holst at Philips intended to integrate the research laboratory into the company as a whole. Holst’s policy as a
research director will be illustrated using the case of Philips’ radio research. A comparative discussion of industrial
research in the 1930s within both companies shows that the “successful” integration of research activities is context-
dependent.
Keywords: History of industrial research; Organizational structure and culture; Science, technology and industry
RESEARCH IN INDUSTRY
The process of invention changed at the turn of the century from being an activity performed by
hobbyists and individual entrepreneurs into a systematically organized discipline.2 Thomas
Hughes, in his analysis of the history of technology argues that: “The engineering departments,
and later the industrial laboratories of these companies, with their far greater material and
personnel resources, took over responsibility for the inventive activity . . .”.3 This happened
first at the end of the nineteenth century in the German chemical industry; in other countries
such labs emerged somewhat later.4 In particular it was small dyestuff firms in Germany that
used knowledge created in research laboratories. The electro-technical industry is the other
sector in which laboratories were established. In the first decades of the twentieth century
several industrial firms in America and Europe established in-house research departments and
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consciously sought to provide themselves with sources of up-to-date knowledge that were
necessary to enter new markets. According to Reich, who wrote about the history of General
Electric’s (GE) Research Department, an industrial laboratory can be characterized as: “ . . . set
apart from production facilities, staffed by people trained in science and advanced engineering
who work toward deeper understandings of corporate-related science and technology, and who
are organized and administered to keep them somewhat insulated from immediate demands yet
responsive to long-term company needs.”5
The research departments and the companies’ research activities fit well in Alfred
Chandler’s model of an integrated company with centralized management and a
diversification policy.6 And although his focus was first of all on the managerial hierarchies
that appeared in the United States, the decision of several European companies, like Siemens
and Philips, to establish a research laboratory are in line with the historical features of big
enterprises as described by Chandler.7 The question is, however, whether the Chandlerian
organization structure and the R&D leadership was decisive in the relative success of
industrial research departments, or if the technology that was developed at that time was just
too important to ignore. The historian Bernard Carlson emphasizes, in line with Chandler’s
approach, the indispensability of the corporation’s structure for diversification processes.8
Innovation is a social process, which means the social setting of the research organisation
shapes technology, and vice versa. More specifically, it is not useful to just analyze the
organizational dynamics and then follow the individual researchers’ or research director’s
activities, but it is the mutual relationship that has to be explored.
In line with this, Lou Galambos emphasizes that most in-house R&D departments were
established in precisely those firms that had worked first to stabilize their internal
organizational structures and that were characterized by a managerial hierarchy which
coordinated a variety of operation units. After building a stable internal structure, the
researchers working within these R&D settings were eager to keep in touch with the
scientific community outside the companies’ walls.9 In other words, according to this body
of literature, it is especially the issue of the organization of industrial research and the
embeddedness of a research department in the company as a whole, which is important for
an historical analysis of an industrial research department.
This article analyzes the history of the Philips Research Laboratory, established in the
Netherlands in 1914, and compares it with the Research Laboratory of the General Electric
Company, established in America in 1900. GE’s Research Laboratory is often taken as an
example for “how to do research in industry.” Historians have referred more than once to GE
as an international trendsetter.10 While the Philips Research Laboratory was growing, Gilles
Holst, Philips’ first research leader, used the GE Research Laboratory as an example.
In what follows, the actors’ motives, strategies, and first activities as well as the
organizational structure of both labs will be investigated. Since the history of GE’s early
research department is already known from literature, this paper will focus primarily on
Philips, bringing in the comparison with GE to explore the thesis that embedding the research
department within the company was the key to success. I will analyze how and why Philips
decided to do research in an industrial context. What were the strategies within Philips and
what were the backgrounds of employees in the company? And how were the research
activities structured in the research organizations in the early years? I will make clear that
economic and business circumstances had an influence on the organizational structure of
Philips’ laboratory. Holst’s policy as a research director will be illustrated using Philips’ radio
research. By demonstrating the dynamic interaction between Philips’ individual radio
researchers, managers, and organizational structures, I will present the way in which the
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Philips research laboratory was integrated into the company as a whole. It is at this point that
I will bring the history of the GE Research Department into the discussion, not only to show
that GE’s lab was an important model for Philips, but also to show that Holst and Whitney,
as the research directors and key persons in the research institutes, molded their
organizational structures in various ways. It will become clear that it is too easy to say that
Holst blindly copied GE’s research organization.
THE PHILIPS RESEARCH DEPARTMENT UNDER HOLST11
The Philips company was established in the Netherlands in 1891 by Gerard Philips as a light
bulb company. Gerard started his company in a traditional way using family capital.12
Around 1900 his younger brother Anton Philips, a salesman with a personal interest in
technology, joined him. Together they were responsible for the turbulent growth of the
company during the first half of the twentieth century. During negotiations with competitors
about markets and technology, the Philips brothers realized that they needed to establish
long-term solutions if they were to keep up with the technological and market race. In other
words, it was not enough for Philips to simply have a tradition of innovation—they also
needed to create a stable company structure that permitted the coordination between people
and resources that was necessary for developing innovations.13 Another reason for the Philips
brothers to establish a Research Department was the re-introduction of a Dutch patent law in
1912. Through their activities on the international market, the Philips brothers knew all about
the importance of patents.14 The reintroduction of the Dutch patent law strengthened the need
for an articulated patent policy.15 The absence of a patent law in the Netherlands before 1912
enabled Philips to make extensive use of the inventions of others—Dutch industrialists were
free to exploit inventions made by other (foreign) industrial companies. Dutch industrialists
copied German and American technological developments and implemented them to exploit
the domestic markets. Such a “highwayman” attitude was to change after the implementation
of the new patent legislation.
The Philips Research Department’s history started when, in the winter of 1913–14, Gerard
Philips and his brother Anton (the company owners and the key-persons in its development
at the time) decided to found the research organization as a separate part of their company
in Eindhoven. The Philips brothers had advertised in a Dutch newspaper and asked for an
“able young Doctor of Physics, must be a good experimenter.”16 Gilles Holst, a 27-year-old
physicist, working at Leiden University, applied for the job and Gerard Philips invited him
for an interview. Philips offered him the new position and on 2 January 1914 he started to
work for Philips. His task was to set up a new organization within the Philips company. Holst
was to be Philips’ first researcher and later its first official research director.
At its inception, the Philips Research Department took on testing and trouble shooting
incandescent lamps. Whereas the researchers’ task had in the first place been to concentrate
on trouble shooting, they also tried from the very start to carry out development-oriented
research and to get a deeper understanding of physical phenomena. For that reason we can
typify the Philips lab in this period as a hybrid research laboratory. Several researchers were
hired to assist Holst in the research project. The Kamerlingh Onnes university laboratory
proved to be an important source of knowledge and personnel. Kamerlingh Onnes received
the Nobel Prize for physics in 1913 and he built up a research laboratory in Leiden.17 All the
work on perfecting incandescent lamps resulted in a stream of papers about lamp-related
problems. From the Philips Research Department’s publications it can be gathered that the
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
4:
03
 2
7 
Ma
y 
20
11
112 F. K. BOERSMA
research activities focused on light bulbs and related phenomena.18 From the beginning,
Holst introduced some academic-cultural aspects in a structural way. Particularly by
attending colloquia and scientific publishing, the Philips researchers remained in contact with
academic structures. Holst invited the professor of theoretical physics, Paul Ehrenfest from
Leiden University, to set up a series of seminars to clarify theoretical and methodological
scientific problems.
By trouble shooting and further developing incandescent lamps, the Philips lab
accomplished the mission for which it had been established. The ability to combine technical
and organizational capability proved to be the condition needed to survive in the incandescent
lamp market and to enter into new markets. Whereas in America GE virtually had a
monopoly on its domestic market after the “merger wave” and because of its patent portfolio,
Philips worked on the European incandescent lamp in which a variety of firms competed. The
strongest of the competitors eventually became partners in several cartels—especially in the
Phoebus incandescent lamp cartel, which was set up at the end of 1924. This Swiss
corporation set the rules, controlled prices, regulated sales, implemented policy and
established a testing laboratory to ensure the product quality of its members.19 GE
concentrated its activities on its domestic market and did not participate in Phoebus although
it held equity in major European firms like Philips, Siemens and AEG. A further step for
Philips was that of obtaining more patents and assisting the company in its diversification
process.
In 1923 the Philips Research Department moved into a new building.20 It gave Holst the
resources he needed and it enabled him to expand the scope of the research activities. The
new building had services like a well-equipped library, research rooms and a meeting room
that provided a climate in which transfer of knowledge was possible. The Research
Department started in the 1920s with a diversification program in order to fulfil Anton
Philips’ wishes and to satisfy his diversification policy. Work on artifacts, such as gas
discharge lamps, X-ray technology, radio tubes, and later television and materials, expanded
from then on. At that time, the function of a research department became a major question
within Philips.
Holst’s idea about what an industrial laboratory’s task had to be, became clear in a proposal
in which he claimed that: “an industrial laboratory is a facility where problems relevant to the
industry are investigated with the aid of scientific methods and instruments . . . whereas, for
example, in a university laboratory one can always think up a problem that can be solved with
the aid of the available tools, in an industrial laboratory where the problems are given, one
must always ensure that the necessary tools are available.”21 Clearly, in his view, the
company’s policy had to determine the direction of (new) research programs. It is not strange
therefore, to see that Anton Philips’ policy strongly influenced the Research Department’s
operations and dominated both the actual direction of research work and the choice of new
research projects. Holst was to follow, rather than to lead the company’s diversification
activities.
The 1927 Nobel Prize winner Arthur Compton remarked that, at the end of the 1920s, GE
considered the Philips Research Department to be the biggest of all the European
competitors.22 While he may have exaggerated, its competitors did have good reasons for
keeping an eye on Philips. The latter had expanded its facilities in electric lamps during the
1920s and, together with AEG and Siemens, it became one of GE’s biggest overseas
competitors.23 In fact, light bulb technology remained important to Philips because it was
only after having entrenched itself in the lamp market, that the company had its hands free
to pursue the diversification process. Along with the diversification program and the increase
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RESEARCH AT PHILIPS AND GE 113
in personnel, Holst changed the Philips lab’s organizational structure into a more formal
structure. He hired an Executive Engineer (the engineer Verff) to take over some
administrative tasks. Moreover, numerous internal committees such as the radio (tubes and
apparatus) committees, the lamp vacuum committee, the materials committee and several
standardizing committees helped the researchers to stay in touch with each other’s activities.
Protocols, meetings, schedules, minutes and debates appeared everywhere in the Philips
Research Department’s organization.
Roughly speaking the laboratory’s work in the 1930s can be divided into five main
domains, namely research activities in the field of:
1. Light and the production of light, including gas discharges;
2. Radio, including acoustics;
3. Chemistry, including metallurgy;
4. X-ray investigation;
5. Mathematics and mathematical physics.
The number of employees (including assistants and administrators) working at the Philips
Research Department between 1928 and 1946 gives clear evidence of the growth and is
illustrated in Figure 1.24 During the period of growth, Holst had formed what were known as
research groups (three radio groups, an acoustic group, two chemical groups, a gas discharge
group, an X-ray group and a miscellaneous group).
At first glance, this illustrates that the Philips lab’s research structure had become more
formal, but a careful investigation of the researchers’ daily routines shows that this
structure must not be viewed as a strictly formal pattern. Holst attempted to formalize his
organization in order to cope with its expansion, but his idea was to organize the contacts
within the Philips Research Department and to make them as informal as possible—he
FIGURE 1 Total number of the Philips Research Department’s employees 1928–1946.
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strongly believed in the “cross-fertilization” of ideas between researchers. Close contacts
between scientists or groups of scientists would, he believed, enable researchers to think
about combinations of knowledge. Yet through the formation of groups he prevented the
Research Department from becoming disorganized. In 1936 Holst explained the Research
Department’s structure to an outsider and he made clear that, although there were some
group leaders, “We do not have the same organization throughout all the groups working
in the laboratory . . . Our way to attack most problems is to make a general investigation
in the field in question, thus forming people who have knowledge in this domain. In
most cases this proves to be more advantageous than the direct attack on such a
problem.”25
The Research Department provided Philips with a source of up-to-date knowledge,
especially in X-ray technology, radio (both tubes and apparatus) and all kinds of materials
(especially magnetic materials like ferrites). Thanks to the specific knowledge and skills of
scientists and engineers, Philips was able to remain in touch with state-of-the-art
technology.
During meetings of the company’s committees on Philips’ diversification policy, Holst
represented the Research Department’s interests. He was able to do so during the meetings
of the Board of Directors and the company Secretariat, but in particular during the
meetings of the “Orie¨nterings Commissie” (abbreviated to “Orco” and meaning in English:
Orientation Committee). Philips established the Orco in 1932 to guide its diversification
policy.26 It consisted of Philips’ senior managers, members of the Research Department
and members of the Patent Office, and it functioned as a platform for mutual orientation
on matters of scientific and technological significance, patent legislation, commercial
activities and contractual questions. The Orco had the authority to make decisions in cases
where there was significant overlap between the interests of different parts of the
company.27
Philips’ radio research activities, which I present now as an embedded case-study, can
illustrate the claim that Holst built strong connections between the Research Department and
other departments within Philips. The history of the radio research program can offer us a
partial, but clear insight in the emergence of more formal research structures within the
Research Department’s organization and in the contacts between the Research Department
and other parts of the Philips company. The radio research program displayed the important
qualitative characteristics of the way Holst connected his department to other divisions
within the company.
HOLST’S IDEAS ON HOW TO EMBED THE RESEARCH DEPARTMENT IN
THE COMPANY: THE CASE OF RADIO RESEARCH
As we have seen above, the 1920s were a turbulent period for the Philips company, a period
in which its general policy of expansion and step-by-step diversification began. It was
especially the creation of the Phoebus organization cartel that had led to a period of calm for
the international incandescent lamp industry. Philips decided to step into the growing
international radio market. First hesitantly, but gradually more and more enthusiastically
Philips got involved in the production of transmitting and receiving valves.28 Although the
first production of radio valves took place in the workshops of the Research Department
Holst decided to prioritize research into light bulbs and electronic valves. It was Anton
Philips himself who pointed the laboratory in a new direction. Radio technology became
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Philips’ most important diversification program from the 1920s and onwards. Although
Philips was not a first mover in the radio market, the company soon proved to be a successful
actor and innovator in this sector and a competitor that was to be taken seriously by the
American radio industry. Indeed according to the British economist, Christopher Freeman,
“Many of the important inventions concerning radio receivers between the wars were made
by European companies, especially Philips and its subsidiaries. In 1937 Dutch radio exports
were as big as those of the US.”29
At the end of the 1920s, weekly radio apparatus sessions were held within the company.
During the meetings, the technological features of radio sets formed the main topics of
discussion. The shift in direction from the production of radio parts (like valves) towards the
production of complete radio sets complicated the innovation process within Philips. In fact,
it was on the way to becoming an integrated firm. Indeed, the research and development
activities required for completing a radio set demanded a structural adaptation of the
Research Department’s organization. Furthermore, contacts between the Research Depart-
ment and other Philips company sections were formalized. This was notably the case for the
contacts between the Research Department and the Philips Apparatus Department. The
Apparatus Department was built in 1928, which was a year of expansion for Philips in
Eindhoven, and it was one of the biggest factories that Philips had at that time.30 This
department became involved in developing radio sets. For good knowledge interchange
between the Research Department and this factory it was important to make specific, detailed
agreements so that the transfer could be handled.
An appointment made in 1929 shows that the management involved in this transfer had
become aware of what was required. Philips managers decided that there should be seven
distinguishable stages in the development of new radio sets. The first two stages involved
activities that took place in the Research Department: the research and development phase
defining new concepts for radio sets. The Commercial Department became involved in the
third stage and together with that department, the Research Department temporarily accepted
the new device. The Design Department, and especially its industrial designer, the engineer
Kalff, proposed a design which was discussed and revised. After a test fabrication of ten sets,
the sixth stage would be arrived at and the radio set would be approved for mass production,
which was the seventh and final stage.31
What is conspicuous about this route is that it still reflected a one-way development of
radio sets. The new radio set had, so to speak, followed a road from the Research Department
to the factory. Holst however, changed this into mutual development between the Research
Department and the Apparatus Department. The mutual development of radio sets was
possible after a reorganization of the factory’s structure. This new organizational feature
together with the responsibilities attributed to people working within this structure, paved the
way for the combined development of radio sets.
At the same time, at top company level, Philips managers had installed radio committees
in order to improve the innovation process.32 By the end of the twenties, four committees had
been formed by the Philips Board of Directors: the New Articles Committee, the Radio Tubes
Committee, the Radio Apparatus Committee and the Radio Tubes and Apparatus Contact
Committee.33 The formation of these committees is illustrative of the varied nature of radio
research, the involvement of various departments and Philips’ attempts to restructure its
organization. The director’s initiative was not, however, a guarantee for good collaboration
between the radio groups and departments within Philips. Bad collaboration between the
designers of radio sets and radio tubes was often the topic of discussion during the meetings
organized by these committees.34
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Therefore, at the beginning of the 1930’s the time was ripe for thinking about adapting the
Research Department’s organizational structure. Holst had formed several new research
groups within his organization. Although the division into groups did not mean that in
practice research was channeled into a strict pattern, group-formation did reveal the attempt
to structure the innovation process. He was successful in his efforts to build up a sound
organization and it was especially radio research that became well structured and embedded
within the organization as a whole.
Holst reorganized the research structure of groups, for example the Radio Tubes Group.
This process of organization and reorganization is illustrative of the dynamic 1930s period.
From the minutes of the meeting of February 1934, the new Radio Tube Group structure
becomes clear.35 Three sub-groups had been formed within the Radio Tube Group. The task
of the first group was to make improvements in radio tube cathodes. These researchers
particularly investigated the working of getters, the evaporation of cathodes and the
insulation of tubes. These were all technical problems that were generic to all sorts of tubes,
they were not problems peculiar to radio tubes, so that the researchers could use their
knowledge gained earlier when developing other tubes. The task of the second group was to
work on the geometry or design of radio tubes. Finally the third group, headed by Van der
Pol (who was the most important and gifted radio researcher at Philips), had to examine more
complex questions like the issue of the secondary emission of electrons.
For the radio innovation process as a whole, this reorganization had enormous
consequences. The change of organization structures at Philips’ Research Department and
within other Philips’ departments influenced the manufacture of radio parts as well as
research activities into radio technology.
PROTOCOLS FOR INNOVATION WITHIN PHILIPS
What we have seen thus far is that, like other Philips departments, the Research Department
was reorganized in the 1930s. Of course, a formal (deliberated) organizational structure says
nothing about good knowledge transfer between the departments. To evaluate this one must
analyze the contacts between groups and departments. In other words, it is interesting to see
if and how contacts between the Research Department and Philips’ Apparatus Department
became formalized. In this way we can see how the development of radio sets was to become
very much a matter of co-operation. How these contacts became structured can be gathered
from the protocol entitled “Agreements between the Research Department, the Apparatus
Department and the Apparatus Laboratory concerning the normal developmental course to be
followed for receiver apparatus,” that was drawn up in December 1933.36
This protocol, that was drawn up by Bouman (head of the Radio Apparatus Department’s
design group) and Tellegen (a Philips researcher working closely together with Holst),
structured the developmental course for new apparatus. It contained formal actions. First of
all, a conference with members of the Apparatus Department, the Commercial Department,
and the Research Department determined the development “route” to be followed by a new
radio receiver type. For those types that could be developed by the Apparatus Department
only the basic scheme of radio sets was discussed in a meeting with researchers. Such a radio
set consisted of well-known principles and parts. For each radio set that the Research
Department and the Apparatus Department developed together, there was a researcher who
made up the basic scheme for the new set. This scheme was subsequently discussed with a
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member of the Apparatus Department laboratory. The outcome of that discussion was a
shared responsibility for the new radio set.
The Apparatus Department’s development group elaborated the details. During this
developmental phase the researcher Rinia could be consulted on technical matters.
Subsequently, temporary versions of the basic scheme were sent around within the Apparatus
Department and within the Research Department, so that as many people as possible could
take advantage of the newest knowledge. Bouman (see earlier) was responsible for the final
version. A chassis would be designed by the Apparatus Department and discussed with the
Research Department and the design group then made the prototype. The prototype was
constructed in two stages. During the first stage a Philips researcher made only essential
changes so that it would work. The second stage of development took place within the
Apparatus Department’s laboratory. This stage involved the updating of the basic scheme.
When changes were necessary, the Research Department had to be consulted. Changes were
implemented and written in the Apparatus Department’s laboratory notebook and the
apparatuses that had been modified were tested. For the total execution of the second stage
it was again Bouman who was responsible.
To conclude, a clear and formal protocol structured the transfer of knowledge and
production that was to become routine work. Of course, one should not only look at the
content of the formal (deliberated) protocols, but also at the execution of them in practice. A
well-structured plan on paper is not a guarantee for good co-operation. Interviews (which are
left in the Philips archives) do, however, support the view that there was a degree of
commitment from both sides to comply with the protocol.37 From minutes of meetings held
in the thirties, which were attended by members of the Research Department and by people
from the Apparatus Departments laboratory, it can be concluded that technological exchange
was intensive and detailed, with contributions being made by both parties.38
The intensive collaboration sketched above between Holst’s radio research and the
company’s radio production, was not an exception. Holst used the same mechanism to
structure the contacts between the lab and the Patent Department, which was done by means
of a protocol that was formulated during the Patent Conference.39 The protocol structured and
standardized the route for obtaining a patent. When problems became visible during the
execution of the protocol, Holst together with Hijmans, the director of the Philips Patent
Department, were able to change and improve it. The formal structure shaped his researchers’
actions enabling knowledge to be exchanged, but simultaneously Holst was able to modify
this organizational structure as soon as it became constraining, and he created a new one over
the course of time.
THE GENERAL ELECTRIC RESEARCH DEPARTMENT TAKEN AS AN
EXAMPLE
The radio research case shows that it was essential for Holst to embed his department in the
company as a whole. As his organization grew, Holst also looked into the way other
companies tried to carry out research activities in an industrial context. He and his colleagues
took the GE laboratory and its researchers as their main example. The GE Research
Laboratory’s Guest Book, which was left in Whitney’s office between 1921 and 1935, shows
traces of a visit by Dr Oosterhuis, who was Holst’s right hand man during the period of his
directorate, in March 1925.40 He must have been enthusiastic about what he saw there
because a few months later Holst and the most important Philips radio researcher Van der Pol
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also visited the GE Research Laboratory. Their entries in the Guest Book are dated
September 1925. Three years later, Anton Philips and Holst visited the GE laboratories again
to see what Whitney’s organization was like.
Conversely, it also became obvious to GE that the Philips Research Department was an
organization to be taken seriously. Several GE researchers visited the Philips lab on matters of
general interest. In the winter of 1922–23 Rice, GE’s honorary chairman, and Whitney traveled
to Europe to investigate the state of scientific research and engineering work both at
universities and in industry.41 They spent some days in the Netherlands visiting Philips at
Eindhoven and they remarked: “Philips is most progressive and has started a research
laboratory under the charge of Dr Holst, assisted by a group of able young scientists. We were
most favorably impressed with the character of these men and the quality of their work.”42
As is well known among business historians, GE was one of the most important industrial
research labs in the United States. Organized industrial research first emerged there between
the time that the big railroad companies hired their first scientists at the end of the nineteenth
century, and 1900, when General Electric’s management decided to establish a research
laboratory. The latter took the German situation as an example of in-house research in
industry—the organization of industrial research was pioneered in Europe. By establishing a
research laboratory, General Electric followed the example of German firms in hiring
individual scientists to work in a new kind of a research organization.43 One of the first and
most successful inventions of this research institute, made by the researcher Coolidge, was the
tungsten filament. This success gave GE a commercial advantage in the electric lighting
industry.
Gradually, Whitney, the GE research director, transformed his Research Laboratory from
constituting a modest part of the company to being an organization in its own right. GE’s
model of a research laboratory was then taken as an example by American industry. US
companies such as DuPont, Eastman Kodak and General Motors sent people to Whitney to
learn about his organization.44 Only after having built a stable enterprise, could managers
reflect on an in-house research program and product and data exchange between the
laboratory and other departments became possible. This is also true for Philips. It took GE
as an example because GE was the first firm to have such a laboratory. Thus historian George
Wise has pointed out that “. . . evidence that the GE example exerted influence on the
continent shows up in a 1922 letter from the Dutch physicist Balthasar Van Der Pol to British
colleague Edward Appleton. Discussing a job offer he recently received from the Philips
Company, Van Der Pol writes: ‘new laboratories are being built in the American G.E.C.
fashion . . . my job would be wholly independent of the work. Working in this general
scientific way already pays. They have the example of Langmuir’.”45
At that time—in the mid 1920s—the GE Research Laboratory was a fully-grown
organization having about 300 employees, more than 130 highly educated researchers and
some 25 people with doctorates.46 Philips researchers only started to see the GE laboratory
as an example when Philips and GE had been through a period of expansion in which the
internal organization was strengthened. However, the way in which the research
organizations became part of their company’s structure and the paths taken by both firms to
reach that point were different. Industrial research remained a fragile process and there was
no guarantee of (organizational and technical) success.
Van der Pol’s remark illustrates a striking feature of the firm’s innovation process—the
laboratories’ tasks to improve and accomplish products and to deliver technical know-how—
was a process that was not guided either by individual efforts or by organizational factors,
but which rather comprehended both aspects in miscellaneous ways.
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The historical study above illustrates how and why Philips set up a research laboratory
under specific technical, economical and political circumstances. It also illustrates how Holst
organized communication inside the organization via formal and informal lines. Philips’
research director had to find ways of enabling individual researchers to maintain their
professional status. He successfully used organizational innovations. As long as his
laboratory was housed in or close to the factories Holst could adopt an informal “face to face”
style of management. However, as soon as he was confronted with an expanding organization
he was forced to change his informal style of leadership. Moreover, the distance between
research and manufacture increased dramatically when Philips established a new laboratory
building, which meant that the research director had to rethink how knowledge could be
transferred to other parts of the firm.
In what follows, I will briefly investigate how GE’s research director Whitney tried to
exchange knowledge with managers from other company units using their organizational
structures. In the end it will become clear that for the positioning of their research
organizations Whitney and Holst used various strategies and that they had different
management styles.
WHITNEY’S SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH IDEAL
According to his biographer, George Wise, Whitney found too much organization
counterproductive. The growth of the laboratory, however, forced him to constantly re-think
and re-structure his department to achieve work co-ordination. After the First World War, he
nominated several of his best researchers such as Coolidge, Langmuir, Hull and Dushman to
become informal group leaders, each with a different style of leadership.
With his style of management Whitney had found a compromise between a bureaucratic
organization and an anarchic laboratory. Whitney believed that encouraging gifted
researchers offered the best path to producing better light bulbs, patents and new products.
However, although he stimulated his researchers to participate in committees like the Lamp
Vacuum Committee, Whitney wanted to keep his distance from the GE factories.47 According
to Wise, Whitney stuck to this unsystematic style even when his organization expanded and
the GE product portfolio diversified. Whitney, maintained that “committees cannot invent,”
noted that he feared a rigid organization and system and that he wanted to remain
independent from other parts of the company.48
Before we analyze Whitney’s policy, we must take the changing aspects of GE’s structure
into consideration. In the first decades of the twentieth century, General Electric had rapidly
diversified its product lines and was headed by a rather complex management. Although it
tried to centralize the organizational structure in the 1920s, GE became even less centralized
than it had been in the 1890s. Divisions were set up as complete business entities and their
own organizations were responsible for manufacturing and sales.49 The most important
decentralized departments of GE were the Incandescent Lamp Department encompassing
several plants and sales departments, the Merchandise Department also including plants and
field sales representatives, the Electric Refrigeration Department, the Air Conditioning
Department, and the Plastics Department. The alleged advantage of this decentralization
principle was that it would segregate certain activities so that the responsibility for results
would be appropriately allocated to the management put in charge of those divisions.
However, the managers that GE employed for its new departments had a variety of
backgrounds, which meant that the company had a heterogeneous group of managers.
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Although GE had established dozens of committees for the exchange of knowledge and ideas
among these managers, the main disadvantage of such company policy was that the various
company departments continued to be isolated. Earlier, GE’s management had tried to
improve the integration of the departments. In order to control the activities of the Research
Laboratory GE had established a Research Laboratory Advisory Council that took care of the
laboratory’s position within the company.50 This council however, was terminated in 1919
and from then on research activities were coordinated with the help of numerous committees
for radio, X-ray and lamp technologies and for engineering and standardizing questions. The
idea was that by participating in a myriad of such committees, Whitney would keep into
touch with the company.51
Still, Whitney used these committees for superficial contacts rather than to introduce
standardized means for knowledge exchange between his organization and other parts of the
company. Again, this was a result of his policy to stay away from everyday problems. It has
to be said that the lack of cohesion between the Research Laboratory and other parts of the
General Electric Company except for the Patent Department was not only Whitney’s
problem. Whitney worked in an expanding company in which there was little institutional
cohesion in the 1920s. According to David Nye, who wrote a book about GE’s image in the
first part of the twentieth century, GE managers shared no common vision, and most of the
individual managers operated in isolation.52
It is interesting here to see that the company set up various summer camps in Schenectady
for its management between about 1910 and 1950. The company ran these camps on its own
island, called Association Island. The Camp General had the most prestige and only a
privileged number of promising young men (known as PYM—no women were invited) were
invited to join the camp.53 This camp served as a way of selecting future managers, thus
functioning as a recruitment organization, but was also a means of establishing informal
contact and exchanging knowledge between managers from various GE departments.54
Whitney, Langmuir and Coolidge were frequently present on behalf of the Research
Laboratory at Camp General.55 There they participated in sporting events, and in
competitions and in informal discussions together with managers from other GE departments.
These discussions focused on the links between GE departments and management levels.
Whitney believed in such contacts. The slogan written above his office was illustrative of
his characteristic philosophy: “Come in, rain or shine”. It was a unique plea for personal
contact between industrial researchers and managers. It reflected the spirit of the man and the
type of organization he brought into being.
Whitney earned a lot of respect for his kind of leadership. But there was tension too.
Whitney was too keen on having his laboratory become a scientific organization in its own
right.56 Whitney’s rhetoric about the benefit of “pure” science for industry and his idea of
organizing the research staff as a family, became something of a liability at the end of the
1920s. His organization had simply grown too big for a family approach and the contacts
with other parts of the company could no longer rely upon informal lines of contact. The
Research Laboratory’s staff was reduced and its position questioned during the economic
crisis of the early 1930s. According to Wise, Whitney’s organization was shaken but
remained intact, he himself did not. Whitney, the dean of industrial research, as he was called
after his retirement57, had to step down as research director in the fall of 1932. Coolidge
succeeded him. The latter continued to pursue Whitney’s idea about the value of science in
industry but he also proved to be a more competent organizer.
Ironically, a month after Whitney’s retirement as director of the Research Laboratory,
Langmuir became the first American industrial scientist to win the Nobel Prize. In spite of
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the crisis that the GE’s Research Laboratory was going through at the time, this prize can be
seen as a reward for Whitney’s efforts too for he had enabled talented researchers like
Langmuir to practice science in an industrial environment. And although Langmuir’s position
was rather exceptional even under Whitney’s leadership, he stands for Whitney’s ideal of
“the” industrial research worker. Eventually, it was Coolidge who improved Whitney’s style
that had become somewhat outmoded. He realized that planning, strategy formulation,
structuring research and embedding the research organization in the company was becoming
a more important task than merely stimulating his researchers.
WHITNEY VERSUS HOLST: SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES IN
STRATEGIES AND STYLES
Although Holst’s first activities were meant to support production, he vigorously created an
open academic sphere as the basis for his organization. In dealing with his contacts with the
Dutch universities and The Delft Polytechnic, Holst drew on institutional structures from
earlier experience gained at the Kamerling Onnes university lab where he had worked for a
couple of years. Like Whitney at GE, Holst tried to co-ordinate research and the
accommodation of researchers in industrial settings by stimulating people to publish
scientific articles in external journals as well as in in-house technical publications. Above all
else, the start of a series of colloquia in 1920 constituted part of a move to stimulate the
transfer of knowledge from the Philips lab to the university and vice versa. In doing so, he
was inspired by his colleague at GE, Whitney.
Interestingly, Ehrenfest, who had started the colloquia at Philips, had also visited the GE
Research Laboratory in the mid-1920s to give a lecture.58 During that visit he had learned,
in his own words, “about the sense and value of industrial research.”59 Ehrenfest’s visit to the
GE laboratory enabled him to use the seminars for an extensive knowledge exchange. His
contacts with GE researchers of course provided useful ways for Philips researchers to learn
about their GE colleagues. Langmuir also visited Philips researchers in Eindhoven.
However, although it was important to publish scientific papers and to organize scientific
lectures, that was not Holst’s main task. After all, he was employed by an industrial firm and
had to come up with patents and new products for his company. As we have seen in the radio
case, Holst had formalized the knowledge exchange between his research organization and
the other Philips departments.
Holst was fully aware of his position in industry—during the company committee
meetings concerning the diversification policy, he represented Philips’ research interests. The
way in which the Philips organization was structured (like the earlier mentioned Orco-
structure) enabled Holst to stay in close contact with other departments. According to Holst,
the lab’s growth as a reaction to the Philips diversification policy demanded stable structural
integration within the firm. As we can see from the radio case, Holst was a gifted organizer
who intelligently exploited various communication channels. What is clear is that Holst, in
the footsteps of Anton Philips, had accurately integrated the Research Department into the
Philips Company.
According to Holst an important task for an industrial research director was to position the
Research Department in the company as a whole. His input during a discussion within Philips
about the benefit of scientific research in the company can illustrate this. The discussion took
place shortly after the economic crisis of the 1930s. In 1935 the Philips Board of Directors
considered the possibility of transforming the Research Department into an independent
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corporation. The director of that corporation did not necessarily have to be a member of the
Philips company. In that way the corporation employees could do research for any Dutch firm
that wanted to pay for such a service by means of a subscription. Maintaining high level
research activities was something that interested many companies. For Philips, such a structure
could result in tax advantages.60 Therefore, the company lawyer, F.E. Spat, carefully
investigated the possibilities of carrying out the plan. He concluded that it was too problematic.
In the first place he saw too many demarcation problems in detaching the Research Department
and the factory labs from the Philips organization. For that reason Anton Philips, whose opinion
was expressed by Spat during the meeting, opposed the construction. Philips Patent
Department’s head Hijmans agreed with him, adding that a considered patent policy would be
impossible in such an organization. The Philips management, including Holst, came to the
conclusion that the Research Department was so well integrated into the various parts of the
company (the Orco meetings, for example, illustrate this) that doing away with the organization
would give rise to too many demarcation problems.
This differed sharply from Whitney’s organization that became more and more isolated
from other GE departments. That was not only because GE was a more complex company
than Philips, but it was also a consequence of Whitney’s style of leadership.
DISCUSSION. THE HELPING HAND OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Historical literature suggests that just those firms that were able to combine the outcomes of
industrial research (both products and knowledge) with organizational arrangements, were
able to utilize the laboratory sources of technology.61 This is certainly true for Philips. As I
have shown in this article, the institutional bodies Holst was working with assumed that the
main aim was to come up with useful knowledge, products, and patents for the firm. That
implies that he had to think about the embeddedness of the laboratory in the company as a
whole, because the way the research organization was embedded has consequences for the
transfer of knowledge from the lab to different company departments. Working on corporate-
related projects forced him to articulate formal and informal processes required for the
planning and coordination of the different organization levels within the firm.62 Therefore, in
this article I have focused on the Philips Research Department’s institutionalization process
and on its organizational dynamics. What I have tried to show was how this process took
place at Holst’s research lab.
When we compare the Philips Research Department with the GE’s Research Department,
it is first of all important to take the specific context into consideration. GE managed to
become the leading electro-technical firm in America, but defending that position required a
source of technical know-how. After the merger wave of 1895–1904, US antitrust policy
forced firms like GE to seek growth alternatives which meant that research programs were
indispensable. In the Netherlands, the situation was different. Philips, being involved in the
European incandescent lamp market, which was quite chaotic, had to defend its market
position within cartels with several competitors. That required an excellent product and solid
patents. To defend their positions and in order to expand, both companies found a solution
in the establishment of research laboratories.
Like Philips, GE drew on tremendous organizational capabilities to defend their market
position and to enter new markets by diversifying their product lines. Thanks to the
development of the “internal force” of research, Whitney and Holst were able to come up
with the technological knowledge required for short-term demand and to enable their firms
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to think about long-term market developments.63 However, their styles of leadership
influenced the way both industrial research laboratories were organized. This is in line with
Dennis’ argument about why industrial research laboratories could differ: “Given Louis
Galambos’s argument that each firm literally reinvented the processes of managerial
integration in the period between 1900 and 1914, why should we assume AT&T learned
anything from GE on establishing a corporate research laboratory? The irony here is
simple—in the midst of a wave of organizational histories we find that individuals made an
important difference.”64
Although Whitney inspired Holst, the latter did not blindly copy Whitney’s organizational
structure as if it was the best possible model. As I have shown, while the latter wanted to stay
away from the GE factories as much as possible, Holst successfully managed to integrate the
laboratory into the Philips company as a whole by following Anton Philips carefully in his
policy and by making use of the available organizational structures. Holst’s leadership drew on
organizational structures where formal contacts and informal knowledge exchange were
possible. Together with other Philips managers and with Anton Philips himself operating as a
driving force, Holst shaped the Research Department in such a way that individual scientific
action was made possible in a company that demanded specific outcomes of individual acts. He
can be seen as an industrial research entrepreneur, vital to corporate innovation.
In conclusion, Philips learned to overcome numerous organizational problems and
limitations. It was especially the Orco-meetings and its protocols that enabled Holst to stay in
touch with other Philips departments. His strategy as a research director was a mixture of
technical expertise and organizational capabilities. As a result, the Research Department
became well embedded in the company as a whole. In brief, it was not as much technological,
but rather organizational, innovation that made the Research Department a successful part of
the Philips company.
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